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JUDGE MADE LAW UNDER A CIVIL CODE*
Genaro R. Cart/6**
The purpose of modern codification is to regulate in a complete,
systematic, clear, and accurate way a given area of legal relations.
The sought-after ideal is that a solution to all problems and conflicts
arising in such given area be found within a set of rules arranged in
a rational way, free of gaps, overlappings, contradictions, obscurity
and ambiguity. Tne ideal is to eliminate the chaos of isolated
rules-many of them operating as mere survivors of the dead
weight of tradition, while others operate as occasional answers to
concrete requirements -and to substitute for them a harmonic whole
of rules, whose attributes of completeness, systematic consistency,
accuracy, and clarity render it easy to apply.
The existence of this attitude among legislators explains why, at
the time of the enactment of the first modern codes, proposals were
made and statutes were passed prohibiting the judges from inter-
preting the new provisions.1 By means of this simple and deceptive
device, the legislator tried to prevent the judges from destroying
the rational perfection of the code under the pretense of extracting
the "true" meaning of the texts and adapting them to the varied and
shifting requirements of practice. But what these proposals ap-
parently failed to understand is that which this writer calls the
myth of codification, ie., the illusory hope of giving once and for all
a complete, rational, clear, and precise solution to all problems and
conflicts arising in the vast area of private relations. Certainly, this
was not an attitude shared by the jurists charged with drafting the
famous Code Civil.
The modern codification movement, started at the end of the
eighteenth century, found its acme of perfection in the napoleonic
codification, particularly in the French Code Civil of 1804 which to-
day is still known by the name of its inspirer. One of the redactors
of the Code Civil, Portalis, wrote in his Preliminary Report on the
draft:
*This was the ninth of the Tucker Lecture Series, delivered at the Louisiana State
University Law Center on March 26, 1980.
**L.L.B., National University of LaPlata, Argentina; L.L.M., Southern Methodist
University Law School; S.J.D., National University of Buenos Aires, Argentina.
1. See Cueto-Rua, The Future of the Civil Law, 37 LA. L. REV. 645, 655 n.25
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The needs of society are so varied, social intercourse is so ac-
tive, men's interests are so multifarious, and their relations so
extensive, that it is impossible for the legislator to provide for
everything. It is then, to the course of decision (1a jurisprudence)
that we leave: (1) rare and extraordinary cases which cannot
enter into a reasonable legislative plan; (2) details too variable
and contentious to occupy the legislator; and (3) all those objects
which it would be a useless effort to anticipate, or of which
premature anticipation would be dangerous.2
These cautious reflections, which have been recalled in Professor
Julius Stone's translation,3 are a good introduction to the subject of
this article.
This writer will attempt to summarize the ways in which the
courts of Argentina, facing the legislator's passivity, fought to
reduce, in the field of everyday private relations, some of the terri-
ble effects of a rampant inflation that has become the world's
highest. This article will deal with the means and methods used by
Argentine judges to tone down the consequences of the depreciation
of the currency, and it will address the efforts of judges to attain
that goal under a Civil Code that, according to the current construc-
tion, gave an unrestricted legislative support to the so-called
nominalistic principle and constituted an insurmountable obstacle to
the valid efforts of courts to attain that goal.'
In Argentina the first effects of inflation were felt in the late
1940's. During this period there prevailed the generalized conviction
that the problems arising from inflation could not be solved-in any
measure at all-by the judges. It was believed that their in-
terference in such delicate matters would result in a clear trespass
into areas alien to their competence, information and ability and
might only serve the purpose of creating chaos in the field of
general economy and public finance. To the extent that such prob-
lems could be solved through law, it was thought that they called
for legislative action and could not be settled by the courts.5
However, the legislator did not take these problems into account or,
if he did, considered them in a belated and very incomplete manner.
2. See J. PORTALIS, Discours Pr6liminaire sur le Projet de Code Civile, in
DIsCOURS, RAPPORTS ET TRAVAUX INEDITS.
3. See J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 150-51 (1950).
4. See F. TRIGO REPRESAS, OBLIGACIONES DE DINERO Y DEPRECIACION MONETARIA
(1978); L. GURFINKEL DE WENDY, DEPRECIACION MONETARIA (1977); A. MORELLO & A.
TROCCOL, LA REVISION DEL CONTRATO (1977); M. RISOLIA, LA DEPRECIACION MONETARIA
Y EL REGIMEN DE LAS OBLIGACIONES CONTRACTUALES (1960).
5. M6nico v. Grau y Mora SRL, 71 LA LEY 759 (1953); Pacheco Santamarina de
Bustillo v. Card Paulista, 70 LA LEY 399 (1953).
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The rules of the Civil Code (according to the construction then in
fashion) that were a major obstacle in that field for the possible ac-
tion of the course of decisions (Ia jurisprudence) were not modified.
They have not been amended until the present day, in spite of the
fact that the inflationary flood has reached the three-digit level in
the last four or five years.'
In order to appreciate in its proper context the function per-
formed by the Argentine courts in this domain, it is necessary to
supply some background information.
The Argentine Civil Code was the work of one man: Dalmacio
V6lez Sarsfield, an outstanding jurist and a gifted public servant. In
four years of intense labor he prepared the whole draft. Congress
passed the enacting legislation in 1869 without debate, in deference
to the prestige of the drafter.' The Code has a definite "doctrinaire"
penchant. Most of its 4,000-odd sections carry footnotes, some of
them extensive. The footnotes indicate sources, mention discarded
alternative solutions, or comment on those adopted by the drafter.
With additions and partial amendments, the Code has been govern-
ing the area of civil relations in Argentina since its enactment. Ex-
tensive amendments were not introduced until 1968;" however, most
of the original provisions remained unchanged. The 1968 amendment
did not modify those provisions which, according to some of its most
influential promoters, prevented action by the judges in the strug-
gle against the consequences of inflation.
The Argentine Civil Code makes a distinction between obliga-
tions arising from contracts and those belonging to the field of
delicts and quasi-delicts. Among the contractual obligations, the
Code makes a distinction between those whose object is to give a
sum of money and those which have some other object: i.e., obliga-
tions to give specified things, obligations to give unspecified things,
obligations to give a quantity of things, obligations to do or not to
do.
Chapter IV of Title VII of Book II deals with obligations to pay
a sum of money. They are a species of the genus "obligations of giv-
ing." The first article of Chapter IV, devoted to the obligations to
give sums of money, sets forth that such obligations are regulated
"by the provisions governing obligations to give unspecified and
6. The annual cost of living increase reached 347.5% in 1976 and was far over
100% in 1979.
7. See A. CHANETON, HISTORIA DE VELEZ SARSFIELD (1937); P. MARTINEZ,
DALMACIO VELEZ SARSFIELD Y EL CODIGO CIVIL ARGENTINO (1916).
8. See G. BORPA, LA REFORMA DE 1968 AL CODIGO CIVIL (1971); J. LLAMBIAS,
ESTUDIO SOBRE LA REFORMA DEL CODIGO CIVIL (1971).
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nonfungible things (ie., things indicated only by their species) and
obligations to give non-individualized things."' An obligation to give
a quantity of things is an obligation to give things that can be
counted, weighed, or measured.10 In performance of such obligations,
the obligor must give, at the place and time agreed upon, a quantity
of things of the kind and quality named in the obligation." Article
619, which is the specific provision for obligations to give sums of
money, sets forth that "if the debtor's obligation is to deliver certain
quantity of a certain kind of legal tender, the debtor fulfills his
obligation by giving the designated kind... .'"I This provision
establishes the so-called nominalistic principle. If a person under-
takes to pay to another $1,000, on January 1st, 1981, he fulfills his
obligation by delivering on that date one thousand units of the
money, even though in the intervening time the purchasing power of
the currency has undergone modifications. Among the sources of Ar-
ticle 619 of the Argentine Civil Code, V61ez Sarsfield mentions Arti-
cle 1895 of the French Code and Article 2884 of the Code of Loui-
siana of 182521 What happens if the debtor defaults? The solution is
found in Article 622: The delinquent debtor owes the interest
agreed on in the obligation, from its maturity. If no interest has
been agreed upon, he owes the interest established by law; if there
is no applicable provision, he owes the interest determined by the
judge. The source of this article is Article 1153 of the Code
Napoleon in its original wording." V6lez Sarsfield's footnote reads:
"The interest of the money . . . corresponds to the damages the
delinquent debtor should pay."
The consequences of default in the performance of obligations to
give sums of money are not the same as the consequences attending
default in the performance of other contractual obligations. The ex-
tent of the redress in that area is also different from that established
9. C. Civ. art. 6i6 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
10. C. Civ. art. 606 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
11. C. Civ. art. 607 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
12. C. Civ. art. 619 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
13. It corresponds to article 2913 of the present Louisiana Civil Code, included in
the chapter treating the loan for consumption or mutuum. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 2913.
14. Dans les obligations qui se bornent au payement d'une certaine somme, les
dommages et intdrets rdsultants du retard dans 1'execution ne consistent jamais
que dans la condamnation aux intdrets fixds par la loi sauf les rdgles par-
ticulidres au commerce et au cautionnment. Ces dommages et interdts sont dus
sans que le crdancier soit tenu de justifier d'aucune perte. Ils ne son dus que du
jour de la demande, except4 dans les cas ou la loi les fait courir de plein droit.
Le crdancier auquel son ddbiteur en retard a causd, par sa mauvaise foi, un
pre'judice inddpendant de ce retard, peut obtenir des dommages et intdrets
distincts des intdrets moratoires de la crdance.
C. Civ. art. 1153 (Fr.).
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by the Code in the field of obligations arising from delicts and quasi-
delicts.
Title III of Book II, Division I, is headlined "Of damages and in-
terest in the obligations not having sums of money as an object."
This section begins with a definition of damages and interests: they
are "the value of the loss suffered, and of the profit not made by the
creditor due to the non-fulfillment of the obligation." 5 If the default
is in good faith, the redress will cover only those damages that are a
direct and immediate consequence of the failure to perform the
obligation."6 Conversely, if the debtor is in bad faith, redress will
cover also those consequences which are not immediate. In either
case, good or bad faith of the defaulting debtor, the court may allow
recovery of moral damages according to the nature of the event
which gives rise to the liability and the circumstances of the case.
In the field of delicts and quasi-delicts the obligation to redress
is extensive. It covers losses and interest as well as moral
damages. 8 If possible, things shall be returned to their former state;
otherwise, a compensation in money shall be established. 19 Damages
cover not only the loss actually sustained, but also the profit from
which the victim has been deprived."0 The debtor is answerable not
only for the immediate consequences of his act or omission, but also
for the consequences which, though not immediate, he has foreseen
or could have foreseen by exercising due care."' In the event of wan-
ton acts, the obligor may be answerable even for consequences that
are merely contingent.22
Such traits of the law of delicts and quasi-delicts support the
statement that the Argentine Civil Code has adopted the "principle
of integral redress." The concept of "integral redress" also is used
generally in the field of contractual liability. In this domain there is,
however, a single exception: the obligation whose object is to give a
sum of money. With an obligation of this kind, the redress is limited
to the payment of interest, which is awarded as a substitute for the
damages actually sustained by the creditor. However, if the debtor
was able to pay but deliberately abstained from doing so (i.e., when
he failed to perform out of ill will), the rationale of the orthodox con-
struction is that article 622, the provision that restricts redress to
15. C. Civ. art. 519 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
16. C. Civ. art. 520 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
17. C. Civ. art. 522 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
18. C. Civ. art. 1078 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
19. C. Civ. art. 1069 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
20. C. Civ. art. 1069 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
21. C. Civ. art. 904 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
22. C. Civ. art. 905 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
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interest in obligations having as an object a sum of money, does not
contemplate the case of malicious default; it refers only to mere
default. Thus, there is a legislative gap that must be filled by resort-
ing to analogy2 to the malicious default of contractual obligations
not having a sum of money as an object." The debtor of a sum of
money who maliciously fails to pay it in due course must compen-
sate all damages that the creditor might suffer, to the same extent
that the debtor of an obligation not having a sum of money as an ob-
ject must redress the damages.
The preceding version of the system of civil liability in the
Argentine Civil Code serves to illustrate the kinds of legal obstacles
the courts had to surmount in order to find equitable solutions to
the multiple problems created by a growing inflation and compounded
by the absence of effective legislative remedies.
The courts began to resolve these economic problems by resort-
ing to a distinction drawn in German legal theory: the distinction
between "debts of money" and "debts of value."25 That distinction
resembles, although is not identical to, the traditional distinction in
the Argentine Civil Code between obligations having as an object a
sum of money and the remaining obligations..In the debts of money,
money operates in obligatione (in the obligation) as well as in solu-
tione (for the payment). What is due is a quantum, and what is paid
is the amount of money due. In the debts of value, what is due is a
profit or an abstract value. Money is not in obligatione; but it is in
solutione if the default is not remedied in kind. When there is no
compensation in kind, money is paid, not because money was
originally due, but because it represents all other values.2 ' The most
important kinds of debts of value are the obligation to redress the
damage caused by an unlawful act and the obligation to redress the
damage arising from the non-performance of a contractual obliga-
tion, the object of which does not consist of a sum of money.
When problems created by the depreciation of the currency
began to appear with more frequency, Argentine courts repeatedly
employed the distinction between debts of value and debts of
money. In the case of debts of value, the courts adhered to the prin-
ciple of integral redress. In order to determine the sum to be paid
23. C. Civ. art. 16 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
24. C. Civ. art. 520-21 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
25. See A. NUSSBAUM, DERECHO MONETARIO NACIONAL E INTERNACIONAL 161 (A.
Schoo ed. 1954); A. NUSSBAUM, TEORIA JURIDICA DE DINERO 235 (S. Serral trans. 1929);
K. LARENZ, DERECHO DE OBLIGACIONES 138 (S. Briz trans. 1958). See also T. ASCARELLI,
SAGGI GIURIDICI (1949).
26. See A. ALTERINI, Improcedencia del reajuste de las deudas dinerarias, in 29
JURISPENDENCIA ARGENTINA 673-74 n.n. 3 & 5 (1975).
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by the debtor as redress, the courts found it necessary to take into
account the effective purchasing power of the sum of money at the
time of the decision; otherwise, there would be inadequate redress
for the damages actually sustained. Thus, the principle of integral
redress requires that the depreciation of the currency be taken into
account. The debtor does not owe money; he owes a profit or a value
which is not satisfied if the consequences of depreciation are not
compensated.
Although the distinction between debts of money and debts of
value has been criticized by distinguished law professors,' it has
survived the criticisms and has served the purpose of unifying the
course of decisions. Obligations not having as an object the giving of
a sum of money-to use the old terminology of Argentina's Civil
Code-remained acceptably protected from the consequences of infla-
tion due to the use of the concept of debt of value. The system of
the Civil Code was not incompatible with the use of this conceptual
device; on the contrary, the Code gave adequate support to the use
of such a device, although under the garb of a different language.
Argentine judges found it difficult to sit back and impassibly
watch, and even to support, the conduct of the delinquent debtor of
an obligation of money who saw his profits increase at the creditor's
expense in direct proportion to the duration of the delay. If all the
debtor had to pay as redress for the delayed payment was a certain
rate of interest, the unscrupulous or simply careless debtor pre-
ferred not to pay on time, but to delay the proceedings and to use in
the meantime the money of his creditor to whom he would deliver,
in the end, debased money. This consisted of an amount nominally
equal to the sum he should have paid on the date the obligation
matured, plus default interest calculated at a rate always inferior to
the debasing effect of inflation. Unwarranted and protracted litiga-
tion proliferated, causing an additional load on the courts; and there
seemed to be no solution other than legislative action.
However, the legislature did little to help. The Civil Code
amendment of 1968 added a second paragraph to article 622, which
had provided that the delinquent debtor for a debt of money must
pay only default interest as damages. The new paragraph provided
that in case of malicious procedural misconduct with a view to delay
the performance of an obligation to pay sums of money, the court
may impose on the defendant, as an accessory penalty, payment of in-
terest that, together with the compensatory and default interest,
may add up to two and a half times the rate charged by the official
banks for ordinary transactions. Amendments to the procedural law
27. See, e.g., J. RAY, Obligaciones de valor y de dinero, in LA LEY 1975-B-1122.
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introduced rules penalizing the malicious conduct of the debtor-
defendant, but these rules were not effective in putting an erqd to
dilatory tricks.28
The solution had to be found elsewhere; a "construction" of ar-
ticles 619 and 622 of the Civil Code was needed that would allow the
courts to update debts of money, at least after maturity. Distin-
guished jurists" advocated the following solution:
Pursuant to the nominalistic principle, in the case of an obliga-
tion to pay an amount of money, a peso is always equal to a
peso, whatever the variations of the purchasing power of that
currency. But this principle applies only if the debtor does not
default. Until the maturity of the obligation, i.e., until the mo-
ment of its timely performance, the debtor fulfills the obligation
by delivering as many units of the currency agreed upon as
those he undertook to pay, though at the moment of payment
these units may have-due to the inflation-a purchasing power
substantially inferior. This is required by the nominalistic princi-
ple which governs the performance of the obligation; however,
that principle does not apply to the non-performance of the
obligation. In case of default, the general principles of civil
liability which call for integral redress should apply. Therefore,
the delinquent debtor, including the debtor of an obligation to
give a sum of money, is responsible vis-a-vis his creditor for all
damages resulting from the default. Among such damages is the
loss of value of the currency which has taken place between the
event of default and the date of effective payment. Put more
simply, the rule is that debts of money are not updated or "in-
dexed" if the debtor performs in time; they are updated only in
the event of default and only from that moment. This happens
under general rules of civil liability to which the nominalistic
principle must yield in cases of default.
Many judges adopted this course of action, as it seemed to provide
the needed remedy. A distinguished legal scholar who, as a writer
and a judge had consistently held the opposite view, expressed
astonishment at the general near-sightedness- including his own-
that for such a long time had prevented lawyers from seeing
something so simple and obvious."
But was this solution compatible with the system of the Civil
28. See FED. CODE CIv. & COM. P. art. 45 (Argen.).
29. See, e.g., A. BUSTAMANTE, TEORIA GENERAL DE LA RESPONSABILIDAD CIVIL 195
(1973).
30. G. BORDA, Las deudas de dinero y la desvalorizacidn monetaria, in LA LEY
1975-C-794.
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Code? A negative answer to this question has been asserted. The
Civil Code has no general system of civil liability; it has at least two:
one governing contractual liability and the other governing the
liability not arising from a contract. A closer scrutiny reveals three
systems, because the rules on contractual damages do not constitute
a homogeneous set. There are rules applicable to all obligations aris-
ing from contracts that do not have as an object the giving of a sum
of money, and there is a special and different system for those aris-
ing from a contract for the giving of a sum of money. Even if it were
true that the nominalistic principle refers only to the performance of
an obligation to pay a sum of money, failure to perform the obliga-
tion does not remit to a general system of civil liability; the debtor's
non-performance remits to the special system of default of obliga-
tions having as an object a sum of money. This system consists of a
single article in the Argentine Civil Code: article 622. Article 622
provides that in case of default, the debtor must pay only default in-
+erest in lieu of reparation of the damage actually sustained." This
special regime consisting of a sort of tariff-redress operates for the
benefit of the creditor as well as of the debtor: for the former,
because it relieves him of the burden of proving the damages, a burden
which concerns the creditor in all other areas of civil liability; for the
latter, because he knows from the start with certainty the conse-
quences of non-performance. Moreover, the interest that the debtor
pays and the creditor receives as a consequence of the debtor's default
represents the cost for the creditor of obtaining the money elsewhere;
thus, the redress is necessarily equal to the damage.
This interpretation of the Code, supported by one of the most
distinguished Argentine jurists," prevented the "debt of value" solu-
tion from receiving general endorsement by the courts. Some judges
preferred instead to compensate for the depreciation by establishing
a rate of default interest high enough to attain that goal," a device
prima facie consistent with the wording of Article 622. But, this
solution was hampered by the maximum ceiling on compensatory
and default interest and the penalties for malicious misconduct in-
cluded in the 1968 amendment to Article 622. Other courts resigned
themselves to confess their impotence before what they considered
the clear text of the law; and, at the same time that they refused to
31. C. Civ. art. 622 (Argen.) (writer's trans.).
32. J. LLAMBIAS, i Hacia la indexaci6n de las deudas dinerarias?, in 63 EL
DERECHO 871.
33. See 0. BARBERO, Desvalorizacion de la moneda. Deuda dineraria. Intereses, in
29 JURISPURDENCIA ARGENTINA 265 (1975); J. BUSTAMANTE ALSINA, Indexacidn de las
deudas de dinero, in LA LEY 1975-D-585, 588-90; J. RAMIREZ, Depreciacidn de la
moneda. Tasa de interds variable para superar la distinci6n deudas de valor-deudas de
dinero, in JURISPRUDENCIA ARGENTINA, DOCTRINA 362 (1974).
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"index" the debts of money past due, the courts insisted on the
necessity of an immediate legislative solution.
The legislature failed to take remedial action, in spite of the fact
that by the middle of 1975, inflation turned into hyper-inflation;
there were months when the rate of monetary depreciation exceeded
thirty percent. 4 The different divisions of the Appellate Civil Court
of the Capital District and the Commercial Appellate Court added to
the economic chaos by applying disparate criteria.
In order to resolve the situation, the courts resorted to a
remedy provided by the procedural laws; a full court was convened.
When there are disparate criteria on a question of law among two or
more divisions of the same appellate court in such a way that incon-
sistent decisions are rendered, all the divisions of the court must sit
en banc to unify their views. This results in a plenary decision.5 The
Federal Civil and Commercial Code of Procedure provides that the
construction of a law as established in a plenary decision shall be
binding on all the divisions of the same court and on the inferior
judges. The legal doctrine so established can be modified only
through another plenary decision. 6
Both the Civil Appellate Court and the Commercial Appellate
Court of the Capital District convened the full courts in order to
establish a criterion for deciding whether money debts should or
should not be updated. The solutions reached by both courts were,
by and large, coincident; however, the attitudes of the members
were not so harmonious. In both cases the plenary decisions were
reached by majority, not by unanimity, and not all the judges who
voted in the same manner did so for the same reasons. In the
plenary decision of the Civil Appellate Court, 7 for example, the ma-
jority held that "a debt of money must be revalued in relation with
the monetary depreciation in case that the debtor has incurred
default.""u It took the court sitting en banc over three years to reach
34. This situation existed in March, 1976.
35. See C. COLOMBO, COMERCIAL DE LA NACION, ANOTADO Y COMMENTADO 613 (1969).
36. FED. CODE CIV. & COM. P. art. 303 (Argen.).
37. La Amistad SLR v. Iriarte Roberto Co., LA LEY 1977-D-1. The commercial
plenary decision had been reached on April 13, 1977.
38. LA LEY 1977-B-186. The plenary decision of the Commercial Appellate Court,
in its official wording, stated:
In case of default of an obligation to give a sum of money, if the creditor, on ac-
count of the loss of purchasing power of the currency, is damaged to an extension
manifestly not compensated by the interest contemplated by Art. 622 Civil Code,
he shall receive, provided he has claimed it in proper time, an additional sum to
cover the aforesaid damage. This solution shall be applied unless a different one
be required by particular statutory norms.
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this decision. The writer will deal only with those arguments of the
judges of the Civil Appellate Court specifically addressed to over-
coming the obstacles created by the rule of the Argentine Civil
Code concerning the failure to perform obligations having as an ob-
ject a sum of money. Such arguments show the way the Argentine
judges, facing special circumstances, made law under a Civil code.
First Argument: Article 622, restricting redress in case of
default of a debt of money to payment of legal interest, is based on
the presupposition of the non-existence of an acute inflation. If the
presupposed state of affairs does not occur, Article 622 is no longer
applicable. The vacuum left by the inapplicability of the "tariff
system" of redress must be filled, by analogy, through the applica-
tion of the principle of integral redress that underlies the general
system of contractual liability in the Argentine Civil Code, as opposed
to the special one dealing with money debts. Therefore, the mere
default of a money obligation, even if it is not malicious, gives rise
to the obligation to redress the damages actually brought about by
the default. Those damages are the equivalent of the loss in the pur-
chasing power of the currency which took place between the date of
maturity and the date of effective payment.
Second Argument: In adopting the solution of Article
622-restriction of redress to the payment of interest-the Argen-
tine legislature in 1869 followed Article 1532 of the Code Napoleon
but toned down the rigidity of the Napoleonic model which had ex-
pressly excluded any other redress in all cases." The less rigid
Argentine solution was not considered an obstacle for setting aside
the limitation in special cases such as malicious noncompliance. Once
the absence of rigidity in the Argentine provision is thus shown, it
becomes more plausible to accept the thesis that its applicability
depends on the existence of certain conditions, e.g., a minimum
degree of monetary stability.
The first argument is the stronger of the two, the second one
being merely corroborative. The reasoning introduces a tacit
general condition of monetary stability to which the system of
redress (pertaining to money obligations) is subordinated. Justice
Holmes has stated, in a different context, that it is always possible
to imply a condition. The reasonableness of implying a condition in
the law depends on the existence of good reasons to restrict the
area of application of a rule or set of rules. In the case presented, it
is as if one said: "No doubt, this is what the law-maker intended to
fix as damages for failure to perform debts of money, but he did so
having in mind a 'situation of normality which is now absent, and
39. See note 14, supra.
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whose absence justifies a departure from what has been
established." This construction does not create an exception within
a given rule, but fixes external limits of applicability of the rule,
thus creating an opportunity for the application of other provisions.
When judges act in this way, the result of their decisions may
fairly be called "judge-made law." And if they do so while dealing
with a civil code that allegedly regulates all situations falling within
its scope, the result of such acts of judicial creation can reasonably
be described as judge-made law under a Civil Code. The solution
reached by Argentine courts hints at some central traits of the civil
law, as opposed to the common law. These characteristics of a Civil
law system are quite often misunderstood by common-law lawyers.
For example, courts operating under a codified system are not
passive mouthpieces of the codes, but active participants in a joint
and creative effort to keep those bodies of rules alive. Also, a civil
code, if properly drafted and construed, not only offers a good guide
to fill its own gaps, but also is of great help in the necessary and dif-
ficult task (typically performed by courts) of making explicit the im-
plied conditions which restrict the scope of its own rules. Paradox-
ical as it may seem, a good civil code, in the hands of good judges,
can even provide the ground to overcome its own unavoidable
limitations.
While the Argentine courts sitting en banc were following their
slow procedures to reach a plenary decision, substantial changes
were taking place in the Argentine political scene. As a conse-
quence, in April, 1976, the entire composition of the Supreme Court
changed. After a short while, cases were brought before the highest
court challenging the constitutional validity of judgments in which
the claims to update debts of money past due had been upheld or
dismissed. In a series of cases, the Supreme Court ruled that in the
updating of debts of money, the creditor's constitutional right of
property is at stake in the sense that property would be taken from
him without compensation if, on default, the debtor could be released
of his obligation by paying with debased money. The Supreme Court
invoked principles of commutative justice in reaching these deci-
sions. The Court also recognized that the updating does not actually
change the terms of the original economic relation between the par-
ties; rather, it only attempts to maintain this relation by preserving
the purchasing power of the currency initially contemplated by the
parties."
40. Vieytes de Ferndndez J. v. Provincia de Buenos Aires, LA LEY 1976-D-241, is
the leading case.
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However, the argument has been advanced that if the analysis of
the Supreme Court is correct and the constitutional guaranty of
property is at stake, there is no reason to limit the updating of
debts of money to cases of default and only to the extent of the
depreciation suffered thereafter." This argument leads to the con-
clusion that all money debts must be updated whether there is
default or not, and that the updating must cover all the depreciation
which has taken place from the execution of the agreement, with the
exception of special cases. If the Supreme Court were to take this
additional step that seems to be implicit in the decisions already
rendered, then it would no longer be appropriate to describe the
situation in terms of judge-made law under a Civil Code, but
possibly in terms of judge-made law over a Civil Code. But the step
has not yet been taken, and this writer does not believe that the
Court will extend the principle to this extreme.
The fight of Argentine courts, if conceived as a struggle against
inflation, was a lost cause before it began. Inflation cannot be curbed
through judicial action, however persistent, courageous, and wise.
Courts can act only on the effects of inflation at the level of in-
terpersonal relations, not on its causes. Courts can only set
themselves to the task of trying to tone down, at that level, gross
injustice and immorality. In the Argentine case, they have ac-
complished this goal with serious misgivings. One may always ques-
tion whether, in using the poor equipment of judge-made law to
reduce injustice by indexing debts, the courts are not contributing
to perpetuate the very cause whose effects they are trying to sup-
press.
41. See G. BIDART CAMPOS, La indexaci6n de las deudas dinerarias como principio
constitucional, in 72 EL DERECHO 697.
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